Nuclear Deal Essay Example

Nuclear Deal Essay Nucle The Implications for the Indo-U. S. CivilNuclear Deal Justine Isola Justine Isola is Visiting International Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi August 26, 2010 Summary By some calculations, the chances that India will test a nuclear weapon in the coming years are not high. But if India again surprises the world as it did in 1998 with five nuclear explosions in the desert of Rajasthan, then conversations on the implications for the Indo-U. S. ivil-nuclear deal will begin. The record of debate on testing during negotiations reflects the depth of American concern that testing will lead to unstable nuclear escalation and the lengths the U. S. went to in order to deter India from conducting new tests. But it also underscores U. S. resolve to forge a new relationship with India despite evident disagreement on a thorny issue. Studying the finely wrought language of the deal reveals some persisting ambiguity about how the deal would be affected if India were to resume testing.However, in the event of a test, it’s a safe bet that several factors will play into determining U. S. response: the preferences of U. S. leaders, domestic lobbying, and geopolitical balance of power considerations. This response will be constrained by the strength of the U. S. -India relationship. Further, due to Indias deepening nuclear ties with the rest of the world, any U. S. response may have only a modest impact on India. If India Tests? The Implications for the Indo-U. S. Civil-Nuclear Deal 2 e The conclusion of the Indo-U. S. civil-nuclear deal in the fall of 2008 arked the end of three years of negotiations between the U. S. and India. Completion of the deal should not, however, obscure the history of domestic debate within the U. S. and India on how the terms of the deal apply. One issue on which lack of consensus notably persists within the U. S. is how the deal would be affected by India testing a nuclear weapon. As a Carnegie Endowment pub lication released during the thick of negotiations predicted, on the topic of nuclear testing, â€Å"[t]he ambiguities of this agreement invite future disputes and recriminations. 1 More recently, a Council on Foreign Relations backgrounder on the deal echoed this sentiment, referring to the repercussions of testing as â€Å"a potential area of dispute. †2 Examining U. S. laws on nuclear exports and cooperation suggests that the President would have to take some mandatory steps in response to a test. But (s)he would also have some discretionary authority. Looking at public statements and government debate on the issue of testing when Congress was negotiating the terms of the deal only underscores this lingering uncertainty about what India can expect from the U.S. if it resumes testing. However, several factors will certainly play into determining whether testing would jeopardize the agreement: who is in power in Washington, the strength of domestic interest groups, and bala nce of power geopolitics. Analysis of these factors suggests that the increasingly close ties between the U. S. and India may leave the U. S. with limited options for influencing India’s behaviour. Burgeoning nuclear ties between India and the rest of the world may further mean that the end of U. S. nuclear cooperation would have only a modest impact on India.The letter of the law U. S. President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh’s July 18, 2005, joint statement on civilian nuclear cooperation ushered in a heated debate between their two governments on the terms of this partnership. 3 Testing emerged as one of the most contentious issues from the start. Despite Prime Minister Singh’s promise in the joint statement to continue India’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, many non-proliferation advocates in the U. S. were unhappy that the proposed agreement on cooperation did not explicitly prohibit Indian testing.The stakes were nuclear escalation in an unstable South Asia and the spectre of Indian testing triggering global proliferation. Some noted that the terms of 1 See chart accompanying Sharon Squassoni’s â€Å"Issues in U. S. -India Nuclear Cooperation,† Proliferation Analysis, November 7, 2007, http://www. carnegieendowment. org/npp/publications/ index. cfm? fa=view;id=19697. Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan, â€Å"The U. S. -India Nuclear Deal,† Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, Updated November 20, 2009, http://www. cfr. org/publication/9663/ usindia_nuclear_deal_html. Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,† July 18, 2005, http://www. armscontrol. org/print/3292. 2 3 IDSA Issue Brief 3 the deal could in fact make it easier for India to test. 4 Others simply saw not tying the deal to India signing the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty as a missed opportunity for nonproliferation. 5 They pushed for stronger language on the consequences of test ing. It was against this backdrop that Congress was conducting hearings on amending U. S. domestic law to loosen nuclear export legislation — the first hurdle to approving the civil-nuclear deal.The U. S. Atomic Energy Act (AEA) requires a formal agreement delineating the terms of civil-nuclear cooperation and stipulates that several criteria be met before such a â€Å"123 agreement† —so-called after section 123 of the Act — can go into effect. Congress had to exempt the proposed U. S. -India 123 Agreement from some of those criteria. Specifically, Congress had to excuse India from full-scope safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities and allow exports even though India had tested nuclear weapons in 1998. These were two equirements negotiators recognized early on as impossible to meet. 6 President Bush signed the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act into law on December 18, 2006, granting the above exemptions and preli minary approval to the civil-nuclear deal. This legislation arguably comes down clearly on the consequences of future tests: It specifies that all waivers â€Å"shall cease to be effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this title. 7 And it does not exempt India from an Atomic Energy Act provision that in the event of a test, a partner country must return nuclear material and equipment acquired through trade. 8 Of course, the President retains the authority subsequently to waive the AEA’s termination of cooperation requirements if he determines that the â€Å"cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defence and security. †9 Whether or not the U. S. 4See Michael Krepon’s comments at Arms Control Association briefing, â€Å"The Senate and the U. S. Indian Nuclear De al: Issues and Alternatives,† November 14, 2006, http://www. armscontrol. org/ print/3230. See Paul K. Kerr, â€Å"U. S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress,† Congressional Research Service, November 5, 2009, p. 14. Kerr, p. 33. See section 106 â€Å"Inoperability of Determination and Waivers† of Henry J. Hyde United StatesIndia Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006. See section 123(a)(4) of the Atomic Energy Act. Kerr, p. 32. 5 6 7 8 9 If India Tests?The Implications for the Indo-U. S. Civil-Nuclear Deal 4 e would in fact require India to return all transferred materials could well depend on what was transferred. If for example, India had only received supplies inconsequential for proliferation at the time of termination, the U. S. would not likely require the return of materials. But the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy Act clearly provide Congress with unambiguous grounds (some would say mandatory obligations) for ending the deal and req uiring India to return nuclear material if India were to again test weapons.In debating the Hyde Act, the U. S. Congress also addressed concerns that the civil-nuclear deal would make it easier for India to test. For example, then-Senator Obama had proposed an amendment to the bill to â€Å"clarify United States policy in order to deter nuclear testing by foreign governments. †10 This amendment, which encourages limits on Indian reactor fuel reserves in order to make testing more difficult in the event of a cut-off of supplies, appeared in the final version of the Hyde Act as Section 103 (b) (10). 1 Following passage of the Hyde Act, the next hurdle to wrapping up the civil-nuclear deal was garnering Congressional approval for the 123 Agreement reached between leaders in Washington and New Delhi in July 2007. The 123 Agreement’s language on testing is not as clear-cut as that of the Hyde and Atomic Energy Acts. 123 agreements usually explicitly prohibit testing. But In dia had successfully prevented the agreement from including language explicitly stating that renewed nuclear testing would lead to termination of U. S. supplies.The provisions of the 123 Agreement thus raised some questions about whether the U. S. would in fact act decisively were India to test. 12 Congress scrutinized the 123 Agreement’s compliance with the testing provisions of the Hyde and Atomic Energy Acts, focusing on the following passages: The 123 Agreement states that â€Å"[e]ither Party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement prior to its expiration on one year’s written notice to the other Party. †13 10 â€Å"United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act,† Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, p. S10985.For more on Senator Obama’s positions on the civil-nuclear deal see Brahma Chellaney, â€Å"Obama’s India-Nuclear Legacy,† Asian Age, June 18, 2008, http:// chellaney. spaces. live. com/blog/cns! 49 13C7C8A2EA4A30! 622. entry. Section 103(b)(10) of the Hyde Act states, â€Å"Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements. † Chellaney’s article is the source for information about Obama’s amendment appearing in the final version of the bill.For further discussion of perceived inconsistencies between the Hyde Act and the 123 Agreement, see Proceedings of the Brookings Institution, July 30, 2008, Washington, D. C. â€Å"The U. S. -India Nuclear Agreement,† participants Stephen P. Cohen, Strobe Talbott, R. Nicholas burns, and Robert Einhorn, http://www. scribd. com/doc/6397716/Steve-P-Cohen-The-USIndia-NuclearAgreement-the-Brookings-Institution. All citations from version of â€Å"Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement)† released by U. S.Department of State, August 3 2007, merln. ndu. edu/archivepdf/ india/State/90157. pdf. 11 12 13 IDSA Issue Brief 5 However, the agreement advises both the U. S. and India to â€Å"consider the relevant circumstances† and â€Å"take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party’s serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security. † Further, the agreement urges both countries to â€Å"recognize that exercising the right of return† to compel India to send back any nuclear material acquired from the U.S. â€Å"would have profound implications for [U. S. -India] relations. † Finally, the agreement also spells out how the U. S. would help India work with other countries on ensuring its fuel supply if the U. S. were to cease supplying to India. 1 4 Such stipulations provide manoeuvring room for India to defend a decision to test as a response to a new security threat from countries such as China or Pakistan and arguably, for the U. S. to find creative ways to respond. Primary sources from when Congress was conducting hearings on the deal offer some clues to how the U.S. could interpret the above language in future scenarios. For example, correspondence between Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Tom Lantos and State Department assistant secretary for legislative affairs Jeffrey T. Bergner reflects Congressional concern about what was left unsaid in the 123 Agreement. In response to the question â€Å"Would any of these commitments continue to apply if India detonated a nuclear explosive device? If so, under what circumstances? †, the State Department offered reassurances that the U.S. would have the right to cease nuclear cooperation with India â€Å"immediately. †15 In response to concern that t he fuel supply assurances would mitigate the effects of U. S. cut-off, the State Department clarified that the purpose of these assurances was to â€Å"guard against disruptions of fuel supply to India that might occur through no fault of India’s own. †16 In response to a question about how provisions for a â€Å"lifetime† supply for India’s safeguarded reactors was consistent with Senator Obama’s amendment on limiting fuel 14 The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors. If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India,† Ibid. â€Å"Questions for the Record submit ted to Assistant Secretary Bergner by Chairman Tom Lantos House Committee on Foreign Affairs,† October 5, 2007, Question 16.Ibid. , Questions 17 and 18. 15 16 If India Tests? The Implications for the Indo-U. S. Civil-Nuclear Deal 6 e reactor reserves, the State Department replied simply, â€Å"[w]e do not read these provisions to be inconsistent. †17 Finally, when asked why the agreement does not contain â€Å"explicit† language on â€Å"actions that would give the U. S. the right to terminate nuclear cooperation† in the event of a test, the State Department answered that the agreement â€Å"provides for a clear right for the U. S. o terminate nuclear cooperation and a right to require the return of equipment and materials subject to the agreement in all of the circumstances required under the Atomic Energy Act, including if India detonated a nuclear explosive device†¦Ã¢â‚¬ 18 These exchanges offer some insight into how the U. S. could interpret the provisions on testing and termination in the various components of the civil-nuclear deal should India ever again test. In underscoring the U. S. right to end cooperation and request the return of nuclear materials, the State Department does not specify whether such a response would be mandatory.Eleventh-hour controversy and persisting post-deal ambiguities The clarifications provided by the State Department did not put an end to debate about Indian testing. In fact, the testing controversy remained live even after President Bush signed the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, the legislation that approved the 123 Agreement. For example, before sending the bill to the President, the Senate rejected an eleventh-hour amendment to end nuclear exports if India were to test nuclear weapons. 19And even so, the Indian government was taking no chances.Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had arrived in New Delhi several days after Congress a pproved the bill and was expected by many to get Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s signature on the agreement. 20 But the Indian government insisted that President Bush sign first, reportedly in the hope that Bush would make a final statement speaking to India’s concerns about continued fuel supplies if India were to conduct a test. 21 On October 8, 2008, President Bush signed the bill without the much-sought after explicit language on the repercussions of testing.In his statement, he noted simply that the legislation authorizing the 123 Agreement â€Å"does not change the 17 18 19 Ibid. , Question 19. Ibid. , Question 35. Bajoria and Pan. Amendment was S. AMDT. 5683 to H. R. 7081 â€Å"To prohibit nuclear trade with India in the event that India detonates a nuclear weapon and to impose certain certification, reporting, and control requirements. † The amendment was introduced and rejected on October 1, 2008. The Senate passed H. R. 7081 the same day. R ama Lakshmi, â€Å"Glitch Delays Signing of India Nuclear Pact,† The Washington Post, October 5, 2008. Ibid. 20 21IDSA Issue Brief 7 fuel assurance commitments that the United States Government has made to the Government of India, as recorded in [the agreement]. †22 Just weeks after Bush signed the 123 Agreement, The Washington Times ran an editorial chastising his administration and Congress for approving the deal and urging the incoming Obama administration to end cooperation if India were to resume testing. 23 Citing â€Å"serious concerns† about the deal’s compliance with the standards of the Hyde Act, the authors argued that â€Å"the next administration must make it clear that conditionality or not, the U.S. will cut off nuclear supplies if India conducts another test. † 24 The Obama administration has not released such a statement. More recently, disagreement on the testing issue contributed to delays resolving the latest successfully conclud ed aspect of the nuclear deal — the terms of the agreement that will allow India to reprocess spent fuel. In an April 5, 2010, interview, the Carnegie Endowment’s Mark Hibbs was asked about what would happen to the reprocessing agreement if India were to test a nuclear weapon. Hibbs explained that lthough â€Å"[t]he arrangements do not explicitly state that an Indian nuclear test would be grounds for suspending U. S. consent to reprocessing †¦ the United States could base suspension upon its determination that a test constituted a serious threat to U. S. national security. †25 An Arms Control Association report on the terms of the reprocessing agreement clarifies how the repercussions of testing could play out, citing the language of the agreement: The â€Å"sole grounds† for seeking suspension are â€Å"exceptional circumstances limited to† a determination by either party that â€Å"continuance of reprocessing of U.S. -obligated material at the Facility would result in a serious threat to the Party’s national security† and a determination that â€Å"suspension is an unavoidable measure. †26 The testing issues, it appears, will not be laid to rest anytime soon. Forecasting U. S. response The above overview provides ample evidence of the primacy of the testing issue in negotiations about the civil-nuclear deal and persisting post-deal ambiguities. As this analysis demonstrates, despite vigorous debate and careful examination of the language of each component of the deal, U.S. response to an Indian test is arguably uncertain. Those who want to predict U. S. response should also be mindful that whatever the deal 23 Lawrence J. Korb and Winny Chen, â€Å"U. S. must suspend deal if India tests another nuke,† The Washington Times, November 11, 2008. Ibid. Mark Hibbs, â€Å"Moving Forward on the U. S. -India Nuclear Deal,† Carnegie Endowment, Q;A, April 5, 2010, http://carnegieendowment. org/ publications/index. cfm? fa=view;id=40491. Daniel Horner, Arms Control Today, â€Å"India, U. S. Agree on Terms for Reprocessing,† May 2010, http://www. rmscontrol. org/act/2010_05/US-IndiaReprocessing). 24 25 26 If India Tests? The Implications for the Indo-U. S. Civil-Nuclear Deal 8 e says, the president and a simple majority in Congress could enact freestanding legislation to end cooperation. 27 For these reasons, in addition to mining the relevant legislation to identify triggers for termination, onlookers should consider how factors such as the makeup of leadership in Washington, pressures from domestic interest groups, and geopolitical context could play a decisive role in shaping this response.Who’s in power in Washington – Studying the copious record of debate on testing is a reminder of the fact that the Bush administration and Congress did not see eye to eye on all aspects of the deal. With a new president and newly elected members of Congress, some of these fault lines may again appear in the future. President Obama’s statements and positions as a senator give reason to believe he would favour acting decisively if India were to test. Some observers have even contended that the Obama administration has been deliberately slow to implement the civil-nuclear deal, perhaps reflecting residual opposition to its terms. 8 If the American public does not re-elect Obama for a second term, this calculus would shift. Turnover in Congress after the upcoming midterm elections could also shake things up. Domestic interest groups – No matter who is in the White House, any President deciding whether or not to terminate cooperation would want to factor into consideration the growing influence of the Indian American lobby in the U. S. and its perception of a U. S. response. 29 The deal signified an elevation of U. S. -India partnership. Ending the deal could be similarly symbolically significant. Business interests will also shape th e nature of U. S. esponse. Some critics of the nuclear deal have long held that business interests drove the initiative. 30 And economic self-interest could certainly reduce the likelihood of U. S. termination. American companies such as GE Hitachi and Westinghouse that are poised to construct nuclear reactors in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat will not want to be cut out of Indian markets. 31 According to a U. S. -India trade group, such business may be worth $130 billion by 2030. 32 27 See Michael A. Levi and Charles D. Ferguson, â€Å"U. S. India Cooperation: A Strategy for Moving Forward,† CSR No. 16, June 2006, Council on Foreign Relations, p. 9. Raja Karthikeya, â€Å"India’s CTBT debate: Conviction or Con‘fusion,’† published on the website of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (http://csis. org), Sept. 28, 2009. For coverage of the growing influence of the Indian American lobby see Mira Kamdar, â€Å"Forget the Israel Lobby. The H ill’s Next Big Player Is Made in India,† The Washington Post, September 30, 2007, http://www. washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/28/ AR2007092801350. html. See for example J. Sri Raman, â€Å"The U. S. -India nuclear deal – one year later,† Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1, 2009, http://www. hebulletin. org/web-edition/features/the-us-indianuclear-deal-one-year-later. Randy Woods, â€Å"India names sites to host reactors by GE Hitachi, Westinghouse,† Nucleonics Week, October 22, 2009. Mark Hibbs, â€Å"Moving Forward on the U. S. -India Nuclear Deal,† Carnegie Endowment, Q;A, April 5, 2010, http://carnegieendowment. org/publications/index. cfm? fa=view;id=40491. 28 29 30 31 32 IDSA Issue Brief 9 Balance of power geopolitics – Concern about preserving the balance of power in Asia and assessing the motives that may have led India to test in the first place will also play a role in determining U.S. response to an Indian test. India may in the future want to expand its nuclear arsenal or increase the credibility of its thermonuclear deterrent in response to developments in neighbouring countries. If India were to test following overt territorial aggression by China or Pakistan, then it is probable the U. S. government would indeed excuse Indian tests. If India were to test in the wake of testing by China or Pakistan, it is again possible that the U. S. would tolerate a reciprocal act, though it is hard to imagine officials in Washington not feeling compelled to respond in some shape or form.It should also be noted that the U. S. will probably have to impose sanctions on India regardless of what steps (if any) it takes with respect to ending nuclear cooperation. The Glenn Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act mandates that the U. S. cease assistance to any non-nuclear weapons state involved in the transfer or use of a nuclear explosive device, although the president has authority to dela y imposing sanctions if he deems they would be â€Å"detrimental to the national security of the United States† and waive them entirely with Congress’s approval. 3 This was the law triggered in 1998 when India conducted five nuclear explosions in the desert of Rajasthan. But the impact of such sanctions has been debated. 34 The political will to maintain sanctions against India (and Pakistan, which had conducted its own nuclear tests following India’s tests) seems to have been lacking as penalizing India became less important than securing business opportunities and India’s partnership on emerging regional security concerns. Congress repealed sanctions against India less than two years after they went into effect. 5 As the above snapshots of the factors that could determine a U. S. response to Indian testing suggest, people-to-people, business, and security ties between the U. S. and India have only grown since then. These factors (with the exception of t he make-up of U. S. leadership) demonstrate the ways in which U. S. response to Indian testing could be complicated by the transformation of the U. S. -India relationship since the end of the Cold War. Increasing partnership may limit the scenarios under which the U. S. would end the civil-nuclear deal or take supplementary steps such as imposing sanctions.Why ending the deal may not matter to India Understanding how India will be impacted by a U. S. response to testing is as important 33 See Section 102(b) of the Arms Control Export Act. India is a non-nuclear weapons state as defined by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. For a comprehensive discussion of the impact of the 1998 sanctions against India and Pakistan see Robert M. Hathaway, â€Å"Confrontation and Retreat: The U. S. Congress and the South Asian Nuclear Tests,† Arms Control Today, January/February 2000, http://www. armscontrol. org/act/2000_0102/rhjf00. Ibid. 34 35 If India Tests?The Implications for the Indo- U. S. Civil-Nuclear Deal 10 e considering the nature of the response. There is good reason to believe that India would as not be adversely affected by a cut-off of U. S. nuclear supplies. Even if the U. S. stops nuclear cooperation with India, several other countries are poised to step in and begin exporting fuel and technology to India. Shortly before Congress approved the deal, the Nuclear Supplies Group agreed to exempt India from the usual rules governing global nuclear trade, freeing India to cooperate with other NSG member states on nuclear trade.India currently has bilateral nuclear agreements in place with the U. S. , France, Russia, Kazakhstan and Canada. 36 The NSG exemption opening up trade with India may in fact be the most significant legacy of the civil-nuclear deal. As George Perkovich explains, â€Å"[i]f India were to test a nuclear device after several years of receiving fuel imports, it would be able to withstand interruption of foreign fuel supplies, especially if in the intervening period India increases its own uranium mining operations. 37 This analysis suggests that Senator Obama was prescient when pushing for limits on Indian reactor fuel reserves. In the future, however, cut-off of U. S. supplies may not be a sufficient tool for preventing Indian proliferation. Conclusion By some calculations, the chances that India will test a nuclear weapon in the coming years have never been high, deal or no deal. But if India again surprises the world as it did in 1998, then conversations on the implications for the deal will undoubtedly be about more than its finely wrought language.The above record of debate on testing speaks to the depth of American concern that testing will lead to unstable nuclear escalation and to the lengths the U. S. went to in order to deter India from conducting new tests. But the end result of those negotiations also underscores U. S. resolve to forge a new relationship with India despite evident disagreement on a thor ny issue. In the event of a test, it’s a safe bet that the preferences of U. S. eaders, domestic lobbying, and geopolitical balance of power considerations will play a role in determining U. S. response. The effect of that response on an India that is itself deepening ties with the U. S. and diversifying its partnerships is equally worth contemplating. 36 Urjit R. Patel, â€Å"Crucial Deadline for Nuclear Energy Business in India,† The Brookings Institution, http://www. brookings. edu/opinions/2010/0817_nuclear_energy_india_patel. aspx. George Perkovich, â€Å"Global implications of the U. S-India deal,† Daedalus, Winter 2010, p. 26. 37

101 Summary and Gender Professor Ramos Blog

101 Summary and Gender Quick Write Quick Write In your own words, what argument is Slaughter making? The Art of Summarizing Chapter 2 explains how to write an extended summary. We will be working with this today moving into beginning our essays. Careful you do not write a list summary or â€Å"closest cliche†. The book treats summary and paraphrase similarly. Keep in mind that you will also be using quotes. We Should All Be Feminist What is a feminist? A person who believes in the social, political, and economic equality of the sexes. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, â€Å"Why Women Still Can’t Have It All†Ã‚  [p. 534] RICHARD DORMENT, â€Å"Why Men Still Can’t Have It All†Ã‚  [p. 555] Slaughter Why Women Still Cant Have it All The Slaughter article was published in  The Atlantic. Take 3 minutes and find something you had a question about or wanted to talk about from the Slaughter article. Dorment Why Men Still Cant Have it All

Rules Governing Accounting of Non-current Tangible Assets Under IAS Essay

Rules Governing Accounting of Non-current Tangible Assets Under IAS - Essay Example Besides the cost of asset IAS 16 has concentrated on the issue of cost of bringing the asset to location and the asset made available under present conditions of its operations as per management intentions. The important thing is that by prescribing this rule IAS 16 has put a limit to capitalization of expenses once the asset starts operating as per intention of management. Another important feature is that ‘employee benefits’ accruing during construction or development of assets as per intended use also need to be capitalized. Further, cost of testing any item of the asset for ensuring its functioning is also required to be capitalized. For example testing fee paid to a laboratory for testing the quality of a part of the machinery is capital cost during initial recognition. But when such cost is incurred after the operation of machinery has started, such costs would be treated as revenue expenditure. IAS 16 states that cost of dismantling and removing an asset and resto ration it where it is located should be capitalized. But the important feature of IAS 16 is that cost that is incurred subsequent to initial recognition on replacing or making an addition to such asset or its part should also be capitalized if such costs meet the recognized principles of accrual economic benefits to the entity and reliable measurement of such subsequent cost. This is clearly the departure from earlier practices of capitalization of assets. When an asset is acquired in exchange of other, the rule is to assess the fair value of both asset and if fair values of the asset given up can be assessed reliably, then that would be the cost of the exchanged asset. But if the fair value of the new asset acquired is more evident, then fair value of such asset would be used as the cost of the asset. However, there is another possibility of the use of carrying value of asset given up as the

Calculated Versus Observed Underwater Sound Speed Essay

Calculated Versus Observed Underwater Sound Speed - Essay Example The speed of sound in air is approximately figured out by the formula . . . speed of sound (m/s) = 331.5 + 0.60 T(C). The speed or velocity, at which sound travels through water was first researched by Sir Isaac Newton in 1687 when he found that measurements of sound in fluids relied only on the physical properties of the fluid, such as elasticity and density (Funk & Wagnalls). The speed of sound in water is about four times greater than that in air. Although this seems to contradict the physical law that the denser the gas, the slower the speed of sound, the sound speed is actually determined more by the elasticity of the medium (Urick, 1983). In 1822, Daniel Colloden used an underwater bell in an attempt to calculate the speed of sound underwater in Lake Geneva, Switzerland. His attempts resulted in figures remarkably close to today's accepted values (Acoustics . . . 2006). But sound speed cannot be discussed without mention of Jaque Sturm, French mathematician, who made the first accurate measurements of sound velocity in water in 1826. World War I created a great necessity to study the propagation of sound under water, with more progress in World War II and increased understanding from current research (Funk & Wagnalls). ... His attempts resulted in figures remarkably close to today's accepted values (Acoustics . . . 2006). But sound speed cannot be discussed without mention of Jaque Sturm, French mathematician, who made the first accurate measurements of sound velocity in water in 1826. World War I created a great necessity to study the propagation of sound under water, with more progress in World War II and increased understanding from current research (Funk & Wagnalls). The fact that sound moves in a straight line in a medium of equal density (ibid.) led to studies of water variables. Sonar's accuracy depends upon: 1. The reflection of sounds propagated in water. 2. Whether sound is reflecting or refracting. 3. Levels of salinity, while generally constant in the open ocean, greatly changes how sound travels through shallow water. 4. Temperature, a foremost factor in sound speed calculations, usually becomes lower at greater depths of water, decreasing sound speed at about 3 m/sec per degree Celsius. Below 1000m, though, temperature becomes generally constant and pressure is the predominant consideration. But a depth change of about 165m can cause the same change in sound speed as a one-degree temperature drop. Acoustic Tomography (a type of underwater CT scan) and Sofar Floats are examples of technologies and instruments that measure the movement of large scale ocean water mass. A unique feature of the ocean is the Sofar Channel in the upper regions of the deep ocean. In this layer of the ocean, at about 1250 meters below the surface in the northwest Atlantic, the temperature and pressure act to provide a "long range acoustic path or channel"(Acoustic . . . 2006). The SOFAR float is an instrument designed to be neutrally buoyant at a certain depth and

Evaluating an International HRM strategy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 5000 words

Evaluating an International HRM strategy - Essay Example Globalization is becoming a reality in the modern business world. Therefore, companies are responding positively to the increased globalization by exploring foreign markets. Many companies have become multinational companies because of their exhibited efforts in taking advantages of emerging markets in different regions. Human resource is of critical importance to companies in their venture of international expansion. Without the proper human resource management strategies, many of the expansion ventures are bound to fail. Human resource personnel are tasked with four critical functions, namely the staffing, performance management, administration, as well as change management. Therefore, human resource managers.International human resource management requires the human resource practitioners to give attention to aspects such as global workforce, international context, the national context, operational issues, strategic issues, competencies, and have projections for the future. During efforts of venturing into a new market, the human resource department needs to develop effective strategies of staffing the foreign subsidiary. The human resource department must balance competencies of the parent company and the foreign subsidiary. In cases whereby a company adopts a joint venture approach, international human resource management becomes very important. The supermarket industry requires competent staff who can deliver quality support services to promote customer satisfaction.

The automobile industry value chain analysis

The automobile industry value chain analysis Section 2: Following on from your analysis in Question 1, discuss the competitive postion of General Motors Europe (GME) at the time of the case. Threat of Entry The automobile industry is facing the mature stage, although the high barriers to entry considering the huge amount of capital required for companies to manufacture and design their cars and the very low switching costs consumers face when changing cars;however it doesnt mean there are no new entrants to Europe for instance Asian automaker as Toyota Nissan and others to be actively present in the market. Threat of Rivalry There is a very high threat of rivalry within the industry, as automaker should always be updated with new technologies, innovation and come out with new models and design. Moreover for GME the exit barrier is relatively high due to investments made throughout the past decades. With the emergence of Asian carmakers in Europe there had been a diversification considering models and prices, in other words it is a diversity of rivals. Threat of Substitutes Substitutes within the industry are more or less depending on consumers and their preference of commuting and travelling, it incorporates cycles, buses, underground and also could be planes and just walking. Consumers arent offended by taking public transports within the most European countries, also traffic jam in some places are reason for not using a car, which decrease the switching cost., plus the high price of gas play a major role. Threat of Suppliers As automakers manufacture their cars so the threat is considerably low, as there are a big number of suppliers GME can choose from, which make suppliers give more discounts, also cars elements are more or less standardised. Most of the time car companies attach with one supplier and there is no forward integration as suppliers are small comparing the automaker and in contrary GME can integrate backwardly the supplier or in some cases they create an alliance to reduce the costs. Threat of Buyers Except big companies buying lots of cars, solobuyers represent an insignificant threat but at the same time its bargaining power is high as the customer has plenty of different brands, models and prices to choose from. The large number of consumers are facing as said before low switching costs and the loyalty brand isnt very high which means that GME has to attract and retain consumers by incentives for example due to price sensitivity, as consumers are looking for the best deals concerning quality/price. Value chain analysis: Primary Activities: The Primary activities for GME are the followings: Product Designing, Resources purchase, Production, Marketing and Distribution and finally Customer Service. Product Designing is becoming of the key features within the industry. As nowadays cars are almost standardised, so with the right tools GME cars have already an image of strength and power. GME is at the same trying to offer cars that are not only powerful but also less fuel consuming. Resource purchase: the purchase of the right material is very important, as seen in Porters Five Forces, suppliers have very low power on GME in other words the organisation can almost select its preferable price over the supplier. Production: GME was the largest manufacture of cars in Europe; the production reached its peak in the early 1990s. However, its methods have showed an inadequacy, as they have been producing more than the demand. GMEs Marketing Distribution efforts havent done an efficient job of pleasing the public. This could be by displaying cars in showrooms, announcement etc. in order to get automobiles GME uses trucks and trains to deliver them to dealers. Customer Service Support: generally supporting the customers after a sale. GME has an 800 number so if customer needs help or have an enquiry they can call for free. Support Activities sustain the daily operations of GME but are not directly implicated in the manufacturing process of GME vehicles. These activities include Human Resources, communications and Consumer crediting. Section 3: Assess the performance improving options taken or proposed by GME at the time of the case. General Motors Electric knew that it could only improve from within (internally) as Macro economic factors like exchange rate, inflation rate etc are beyond their reach. All successful businesses have mainly two aims; cut costs increase sales In GMs case increased sales was not an accessible option, so therefore the company had to focus on performance improving options, here below is what GM proposed at the time of the case. GM reduced its workforce by 20% in an attempt to boost productivity and reduce costs by $600 million Use competitive pricing and offer additional services GME formed a strategic alliance with Fiat SPA in 2001 a restructuring plan called Project Olympia was produced to again reduce costs and decrease production capacity by 15% Closing down Luton plant to again reduce costs Moving production to cheaper areas in this case a German plant was closed down and manufacturing transferred to Poland Integration of operations Abandon cost incurring practices like using different parts and wiring for different cars Strategically GME have achieved both some success and failure in its operations to improve the situation in Europe, for example the reduction of employees and closures of unproductive plants are fully justified as the business cant continue to record huge losses year on year, in fact these decisions should have been made faster reflecting GM poor management structure unable to make quick decisions in a ever changing market. GM was also correct to cut out the practice off using different parts and wiring for different cars as this reduces overheads as any loss making business must cut costs at every opportunity. However there are also strategic failures GM implemented for example a strategic alliance with an Asian manufacturer would have been more beneficial then with Fiat as this alliance could have given GM access to superior management and technology resources, in return GM could have offered some concessions to the US market. Another example of poor strategic decision making is th e use of competitive pricing which a loss making business should never implement as good marketing could over time allow for premium prices. GM should have offered extended warranties as this actually costs the company very little in real terms, in the USA GM offer warranties for 100,000 miles over 5 years perhaps this could be implemented in its European business model. General thoughts on how GM can improve their European performance Change management team in Europe Form strategic alliance with Japanese manufacturer with superior manufacturing techniques Focus on the lucrative segment of the European market Reduce investment in the EU, until the economic situation improves (short-term vs. long-term ) Change EU business model e.g. produce smaller cars which are now popular Offer additional features to their cars Used money saved and invest more in RD Launch long term strategy to recapture market share Conclusion General Motors is the largest automaker in the world and has been an industry leader for 77 years yet it finds its European operations in all kinds of trouble. Huge financial losses, a dissatisfied customer base, competitors with superior management and production techniques to name a few. All of these problems are due to GM having a poor corporate strategy plan, GM become reactive rather then proactive and in strategy you can never rest on your laurels, the company missed clear trends within the market such as a demand for smaller cars, cars with less CO2 emissions, cars with additional features etc. This case is a good example of strategy as it shouldnt be done; strategy requires successful firms to seek feedback from their customers, for firms to have clear and set goals at all time and how to get there, strategy requires firms to ever excel and always be ambitious to seek new and rewarding risks. The main findings of the report suggest that GM didnt have the right business model or structure to cope with sudden change this is slightly understandable due to GM size and decision making tends to be slower amongst large companies due to the amount of management layers, but one would expect a company with manufacturing facilities in 35 countries and sales in 200 countries to at least get the basic rights. GM was guilty of not paying enough attention to the Macro environment were political changes were gearing towards reducing CO2 emissions, GM also underestimated the threat from Asian car companies and as a result quickly lost market share and sales.

Health Care Reform: Effect on Nurses :: Nursing

Health care reform has been a major issue over the past decade. The Nursing industry has in particular experienced a period of unpredictable change. On Dec 24, 2009, a landmark measure was passed in the senate by a vote of 60 to 39. This decision to pass the health care reform will change America forever. Nurses will constitute the largest single group of health care professionals. They will have a huge impact on quality and effectiveness in health care. The nursing industry will help hold this new program together by acting as the glue (The nursing industry will be the glue holding the new health care in tact.) It is estimated that by 2015 the number of nurses will need to increase to over 4 million. Nurses are the backbone of the health care industry thus creating better polices for this profession will help ease the workload and high demand. A nurse’s main concern is always to insure quality care and the safety of their patients. Under the new health care reform several new measures have been set into place to ease the transition and improve the quality of care for all patients. One program is designed to fund scholarships and loan programs to offset the high costs of education. Nursing shortages and the high turnover has become a serious epidemic. Health care reform is supposed going to solve many of these problems. Furthermore, health care reform will provide 47 million Americans with health care. Many of the 3 million nurses see their jobs as constantly changing. Their positions as primary advocates for their patients can be compromised when adequate healthcare is not provided. â€Å"Eighty three percent of Americans believe nurses are honest and have high ethical standards† (American Nurses p4). Nurses are in high demand; patient overload and large shortages of qualified nurses makes their jobs even harder. Health care reform would like to help ease the work load as well as increase the number of nurses coming into this field. These reforms are about delivering care that is more effective in the community. This includes improving out of hospital services to make sure that people are able to access the care they need. Many people go to hospital for a minor cold or a sore throat because they are unable to pay for high costs.(unable to see a physician, who usually requires a patient to have medical insurance.